Our current focus at Cabin is to build a community around a future of decentralized cities to aggregate demand for this decentralized city. But ...
We want to bring increasing amounts of land into the DAO without building a massive balance sheet and without needing to deal with the complexity of the DAO directly owning or operating physical property in diverse jurisdictions around the world. This article ideates on a mechanism to scale Cabin’s available nodes without actually knowing them, using Mike Goldin’s TCR model.
In this article, we answer those questions. We lay out our current hypothesis on how we could effectively bring on new nodes once we’re ready to scale. We also examine how tokens and token-curated registries (TCR) can be the vehicle that aligns incentives amongst the candidates and consumers that benefit from a list, like a list of nodes in a decentralized city.
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But before we get into how Cabin could use a TCR, let’s take a step back into how web2 lists are currently managed.
Think about web2 lists such as Product Hunt, Reddit, and Airbnb. These services rely on a variety of mechanisms to deliver quality listings and keep their customers and service providers, happy:
Even so, there’s misaligned incentives in the system:
Web3 adds another actor with their own incentives into the mix: token holders. Token holders are the ones who stand the most to gain if a list becomes valuable and the token price goes up. This leads us to the idea of the token-curated registry for web3.
Consensys’ Mike Goldin defines token-curated registries as:
Decentrally-curated lists with intrinsic economic incentives for token holders to curate the list’s contents judiciously.
In a token-curated registry, candidates can purchase tokens and make a deposit to add an entry to the registry.
When an applicant nominates an entry, the "challenge period" begins. Once the challenge period expires, entries are included in the registry by default.
Voting only happens if a challenge trial is explicitly raised during the period. If the candidate fails the voting process, they lose their tokens. This prevents candidates from sending in listings “just for the fun of it”.
Inversely, any token holder can challenge and stake their tokens to remove a listing from the registry or to reject a candidate. If the vote passes, the token holder keeps their tokens and the listing is removed. Otherwise, the token holder loses their tokens. This prevents the metaphorical doxxings of innocent candidates, as a victim of power plays by whales.
This TCR-based model for creating and maintaining lists ensures that the consumers, candidates, and community token holders all have aligned incentives.
The token’s price increases in proportion to the quality of the registry and the number of consumers who find it valuable. For a DAO building a decentralized city like Cabin, a TCR-based token model ensures that our token’s value is tied to how well we aggregate demand for our curated list of nodes.
As we mentioned earlier, we want to use the theory of TCRs to curate and maintain a list of Cabin nodes worldwide. Beyond that, this is a good token model for three primary reasons:
The community gets to vote on whether new nodes meet their standards for quality and whether existing nodes fall below that bar.
We can dynamically adjust the amount of token required to stake a node. This will allow for a gradual expansion of supply that ensures supply and demand for land in our decentralized city stay in sync.
By linking staked tokens to demand before a prospective owner operates a node, we align all token holders and continue aggregating demand for our decentralized city.
For instance, the better our media guild raises awareness of Cabin, the better Cabin facilitates the overall growth of the DAO economy. Raising the GDP of DAOs raises the aggregate demand for nodes and makes it more valuable to operate nodes in our decentralized city. Finally, the increased value of Cabin’s city increases the demand for ₡ABIN as more prospective owners stake them to operate more nodes.
As mentioned above, the TCR model allows Cabin to scale our available nodes without actually owning them. We can bring on increasing amounts of land into the DAO without building a massive balance sheet and without needing to deal with the complexity of the DAO directly owning / operating physical property in diverse jurisdictions around the world.
Here’s how it could work:
While running these DAO retreats, we’ll both physically build out Node Zero and also build a playbook for future nodes to follow that will allow us to rapidly scale the supply side, aggregating land to manifest our decentralized city around the world.
Once we have this v0 playbook in place, we can begin experimenting with consensus mechanisms like the TCR to decentralize the decision making in the city and potentially bring other nodes online. We can use TCR and the ₡ABIN token to give the community sufficient control over the operation of nodes. The idea is to ensure the DAO writ large captures a healthy amount of the value it creates from aggregating the demand for a decentralized city.
This would leave us where we want to be.
The core DAO would be a vortex for aggregating the demand of philosophically aligned citizens. Our decentralized city with nodes around the world would then be owned and operated by local members of the DAO. Each node – local, founder-led sub-jurisdictions under Cabin – would then get the attention to its operation that it deserves. This will continuously raise the bar for what it means to be a node.
This is the path to building a world-spanning decentralized city, open to all who wish to join.